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MANAGEMENT OF LUGE-SCALE TECHNOLOGY 
Thc history of thc United Statcs spacc program in the lc%Os has thc 
appeal of something conccivcd with magnificent simplicity and carried 
out on thc grand scale. &tween 1961 and 1970, the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) launched several dozen unmanned 
spacccraft, rcvolutionizing con~munications and metcorological 
technologits, on thc onc hand, and clcctronics and s o h a r e  dcvelopmcnt 
(HI the other. But in the public mind. NASA was most closely associated 
with thc manncd spaceflight programs-Project Mercury (1958-1963). 
which rmed thc ability of onc man :o function up to xvcnl hours in 
Earth orbit: Gemini (1962-I%), in which two mcn in onc spacecraft 
wcrc wigncd a varicry of rasks. incluaing rcndczvous and docking in 
h t h  orbit with a targct vehicle and moving around outside thc spacecraft 
itself, and Apollo (1961-1972). whcrcin thrcc-man crews wcre xct on 
progrcssivcly morc ambitious missions. culminating in the lunar landing 
of July 1969. Mcrcly to sketch the civilian spacc program thus is to in- 
dicate the magnitude of NASA wignmcnts and thc scope of its s u c c ~ .  
Onc must take seriously the contention of Jamcs E. Wcbb, NASA Ad- 
ministrator from 1961 to 1968, that the succcss of NASA was a success in 
organizing "large-scale cndcavors," i.c., that the samc system of 
management that made the lunar landings possible may also have bccn 
thcir mosi important byproduct. 
In this paper. I am going to try to answer th: following qucstion: 
What can thc study of NASA, as an organization. tach us? Using 
Webb's concept of thc large-scale cndcavor as a starting point, I will con- 
centrate on NASA as a going concern; in other words, as an organization 
that, instituted for specific purposes, strove to maintain itsclf, to opctatc 
within thc terms of its establishment , and to compete with other agencies 
for the limited resources madc available by Congrcss and the White 
Houw. Put dfiercntly, thema running through this paper will be: (1) 
how a high-technology agency was run in a dccadc marked by rapid cx- 
pansion of funds and manpower in thc first half and almost as rapid con- 
traction in the second: and (2) how NASA combincc~ centralized planning 
and control with dccentralizcd project cxecution. i n  turn, cach of thew 
themes raiscs subsidiary questions: What criteria r!id the agency use in 
choosing its contractors and, in thc absence of markcr conditions, how did 
it supervise thcm to gct the hvdwarc and services for which it contracted? 
How did NASA rnainta~n its indepcndcncc vis-i-vis the Dcpartnient of 
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Defense (DoD). the one federal agency with which NASA had to come to 
terms? 
The concept of the luge-scale cndeavor is useful but, at the same 
tirnc, difficult to pin down. In his Spuce Age Management, drafted in his 
last months at NASA and published shortly after hc raigned as ad- 
ministrator. Webb discussed the chmctcrisrirs of the large-scale 
endeavor. Typically, the cndeavor rcsults from a new and urgent need or a 
new opponunity created by social, political, tcchnologic~l, or military 
changes in the environment. Most oftcn. it r q u i r a  "doing something for 
the fim tirnc and [has] a high dcgrcc of unccnainty as to prccix results." 
and it will have second- and third-order conxqucnca, oftcn unintended. 
bcyond the main objective. Finally, such endeavors "do not generally rc- 
quire new organizational and administrative forms, but the more cffcctivc 
utilization of existing forms." * Webb's description can, of course. apply 
to many cndeavon beside the space program; the attempt to build and 
operate a national rail passenger network, to develop a strategic 
petrolcum rcscrvc, to build the Alaska pipeline. or to conduct the War on 
Poverty-all share many of the features Webb enumerata. But the spacc 
program and the projects comprising it had certain advantages in 2 tain- 
ing its goals. stemming from thc nature of its mission, which most of the 
endeavors namcd above lacked. 
Fast, the NASA goals could bc stated in prccisc. operational tcrrns. 
The agency would dcscribc a god within the broader mission: put a com- 
murlications satellitc in synchronous Earth orbit; or. develop an un- 
manned cpaiecraft to soft-land on the Mcm and a vchiclc with a liquid- 
hydrogen uppcr stagc to launch it. Such precision may be contrasted with 
those federal agcncia charged with improving the quality of education. 
fighting alcoholism and drug abux, or finding permanent jobs for the 
hard-core uncmploycd. As Charla Lindblom and David Cohcn have 
noted, "Government agcncia are again and again assigned . . . rapon- 
sibilitics bcyond any penon's or organization's known competence. They 
do not typ~caliy resist these assignments because they are funded and 
maintained for then efforts, not for their rcsults.'' 3 
Second, NASA in the early 1360s had an organizational flexibility 
-anmatched by any agency of compamblc size. In this period NASA had 
no formal agency-wide long-range plan; no general advisory committee of 
outside scientists. such as those mablished for the A:omic Energy Com- 
mission and the Depvunent of Ddcnx; no inspector-general, chief 
nientis~. or chid engineer; no centralized range structure for tracking. 
.lata acquisition, and mission control; no central p!anning st& attached 
to the Office of the Administrator. Thex functions wer: handled in 
other. much more deccndized ways. Moreover, the absence of a plan or 
general advisory committee m c d  the agency from becoming aptivc to 
policies which might cease to be relevant. To maintain this flexibility and 
to adapt the agency to change, there were frequent reorganizations, 
notably in 1%1. 1963, 1965. and 1%7. But they were not ends in 
themselves. They were designed less to xt certain things right-for in- 
stance, to improve cornrnunicatlons between decision-makers and their 
supporting st&, or to free the field centers from unneeded supcrvi- 
sion-than to turn the agency from one set of programs to those of quite a 
different sort. For NASA was vulnerable. It had to stake a claim to ter- 
ritory of its own, rather than becoming (as its predcccssor, the Nationd 
Advisory Committee for Aeionautia, had been) a supporting arm of the 
military services, or a supervisory agency with a small in-house stdT and 
cc?ntractor-opcrateci facilities. like the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Finally, NASA in the 1960s was an agency with a single mission-to 
land a man on the Moon and return him szfcly before the end of the 
d~cadc-but with numerous subordinate gods. The Nat~onal 
Aeronautics and Space -4ct enacted by Congress in July 1958 wds per- 
missive rather than mandatory, so far as ends were concerned. It was a 
shopping list as much as an enabling act, freeing NASA to pursue those 
p r ~ q p m s  that were at once technically possible, politically feasible, and 
challenging enough to enlist the support of key technical personnel. So 
that the agency might keep abreast of technical developments, NASA of- 
ficials thought i, nccesjary to devtlop capabilities in basic research or in 
propulsion that were independent of any specific mission or use. This 
policy lessened the danger, noted in a 1966 Senate report, that "there 
may be a pcnalty attached to the 'approved mission' policy for advanced 
development. Premature obsolescence is one hazard. Commitment of 
resources before the full cost-benefit is another. The narrowing of compo- 
nent and subsystem engineering is a third." 
But the conditions I have listed do not explain NASA's success in 
managing large-scale technology. Precise goals and organizational flex- 
ibility help to set the rulcs of the game; they dcfinc, as it were, a policy 
space in which NASA could manage its programs. To show how NASA 
managers worked within that policy space, I want to discuss three areas: 
the problems faced and met in setting up a headquarters organization; 
selecting contractors who could operate in the peculiar environment of 
very large research and development (R&D) programs; and the means by 
which NASA kept the military at arm's length, while receiving the sup- 
port necessary to Izunch and track Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. These 
areas, it seerns to me, can tell I great deal about the success of NASA's ap- 
proach to getting ~ t s  R&D work done. In the find section of this paper, I 
will mention some of the lessons learned and the extent to which NASA 
can serve as a precedent for other luge-scale endeavors. 
Headquarters-Center Relations 
Established by Congress in the aftermath of Sputnik I 2nd 2, NASA 
quickly grew by accretion, the incorporation of older installations, and the 
creation of new capabilities into an agency with 36,000 civil service 
employees and 3 budget of $5.5 billior~ by 1765-1766. Indeed, by 1962, 
NASA had taken on most of the features It possesses today. It was headed 
by an Administrator supported by a Dcputy and an Associate Ad- 
ministrator; together, thew officials comprised the agency's top manage- 
ment. Under them were bureaus with agency-wide functional respon- 
sibilities for procurement, budget preparation, personnel. public dfairs, 
and legislative affairs. Additionally, there were four program offices, each 
headed by an Associate Administrator and responsible for NASA's 
substantive programs. From 1763, these offices were: Space Science and 
Applications; Manned Space Flight, which was responsible for Mercury, 
Gemini. Apollo, and the follow-on to Apollo that became Skylab; Ad- 
vanced Research and Technoiogy, which managed NASA's aeronautical 
research, as well as the supporting research for the other program office:; 
and the Ofice of Tracking and Data Acquisition. All of the field centers 
reported directly :o the program officer. Thus the 14arshall Space Flight 
Center in Huntsville, Alabama, the Kennedy Space Centcr at Cape 
Canaveral, and the Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston all reported to 
the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. The older research 
centers which predated NASA reported to the Ofice for Advanced 
Research and Technology, while the Goddard Space Flight Cent :r in the 
Mxyland suburbs of Washington reported :o the Office of Space Science 
and Applications. There was one other installation that was unique. This 
was the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, which wzs 
operated by the California Institute of Technology under contract to 
NASA. JPL was (and still is) responsible for managing NASA's deep space 
and interplanetary probes and, consequently, teported to the Office of 
Space Science and Applia 2.tions. 
Clearly, a summary of names and reporting responsibilities tells very 
little a h u t  relations between headquarters and the field centers. The ten- 
sign between headquarters and the centers was built into NASA. Head- 
quarters, itself almost a kind of rival installation, had certain key func- 
tions: to prepare and defend the agency budget, to allocate funds for 
R&D and the construction of facilities, and to serve as a cenuzl control 
point. Beyond this, h r e  were problems which senior management could 
hope to resolve only after years of trial and error. One of these wls 
whether the ccntrrs sl~ould repon directly to the agency's general 
manager-the Associate Administrator-or to the heads of the program 
offices. The first approach was the logical solution when the centers were 
involved in a variety of projects; the second. when each center hdd a 
carefully defined task distinct from the other centers. Another problem 
was how centers reporting to one office could work with thw reporting to 
another. A third was the probltm of project assignment: wheher to give 
the entire project to one center, split it between the cwten and designate 
one as "lead," or put the entire project managemem ream in head- 
quarters. A fourth proble..~ was how to convert the older rcsearch- 
oriented institutions into managers of large development contracts. And 
all of these problems were compounded by the difficulties faced by head- 
quarters and the centers in communicating with each other. The greater 
the pressures of time, the faster the rate of significant change in the en- 
vironment; the more interrelated the various programs, the more d~fficult 
and necessary adequate communications would be. 
Yet, by the end of 1963, al! of these problems had brcn provisionallv 
solved. NASA's top officials stressed that project management was the 
field installations' respor~sibiiity and that, within certain limitations im- 
posed by Congress, directors and project managers could move some 
funds from one budgct category to another. For all flight projects except 
Apollo. there was co be one lead center, regardless of how many installa- 
tions actually participated. The tools for getting the job done would be 
grouped in related fashion. Th~is the Office of Applications, which used 
the same launch "chicles and centers as Space Sciences, merged with it in 
1963. Each center was to have the capacity to manage large development 
contracts, and, if necessary, assign projects for which new skills wo~ld  
have to be recruited; the skills to integrate the subsystems of a project 
parcelled out amcng two or three different centers; and the ability to draw 
on the resources of other centers illstead of duplicating them needlessly. 
Concurrent with the change by which the centers reported directly to the 
program offices, NASA instituted two other refolms which greatly im- 
proved opentions. It unified all launch operations at Cape Canaveral, 
where previously each center had had its own launch team; and it 
established intensive monthly status reviews, at which Associate Ad- 
ministrator Robert Seamans would sit down with the heads of the pro- 
gram ofices to review planned versus actual allocations, at the centers and 
at contractor plants: planned versus actual expenditures; miiestones in 
program and procurement schedules; and advanced studies prior td their 
completion. Thex recurring meetings enabled top o f i c i k  to use avcrlap- 
ping sources of information, give all points of view an airing, and 
eliminate thc middleman in channeling information upward. 
NASA Procurement Strategies 
Next to the ordering of headquarters-center relations and in- 
separable from it, the most important dtilsion made by NASA officials 
was to rely on private industry rather than in-house staff to implement its 
R&D programs. Contractors were involved at every stage of R&D a.rd for 
every purpose, from the preparation of advanced studies to systems 
engineering, manufasure of hardware, checkout of flight equipment, 
operation of tracking stations, etc. From the outset NASA chow to follow 
the Air Force 2nd the Atomic Energy 'bmmission ia contracting out; in 
particuiar, the Air Force and its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
programs were the only programs since the Manhattan Project comparable 
to the NASA mission. Both ICBM and Apollo had in common 
technological complexity, tight time schedules, unusual reliability re- 
quirements, a general absence of quantity, and little follow-on produc- 
tion. Although some 20,000 frrms were working on Apollo in the 
mid-1'/60s, a 1969 study showed that NASA had bought only 20 M t r -  
cury, 13 Gemini, and 38 Apollo spacecraft i~~cluding test models and 
spacecraft modified for changed mission objectives. NASA usually had to 
contract for products whose main features could not be precisely defined 
in advance, so that there was no clear-cut basis on which the bidder could 
make realistic cost estimates. For R&D program: of this son. NASA 
waived formal advertising in favor of negotiations with selected bidders. 
Viewed in this light, the rationale for an in-house technical staff was 
to enable NASA to retain those fiinctions that, it has been said, no 
government agency has the right to contract ou:, functions cnurneratrd 
by a former Director of the Bureau of the Budget as "the decisions on 
what work is to be done, what objectives are to be set for the work, what 
time period and what costs are to be associated with the work, what the 
results expected arc to be . . . the evaluation and the responsibiiities for 
knowing whether the work has gone as it was supposed to go, and if it has 
not, what went wrong, and how it can be corrected on subsequent occa- 
sions." This, in fact, was NASA's position: that thc rapid bui!dup of 
the Gemini and Apollo programs precluded reliance on government 
employees alone; that it was agency policy not to dcvelop in-house 
capabikies already available in the private sector; that NASA employees 
were needed for technical direction rather than for hardware fabrication or 
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routine chores; that NASA had developed safeguards for policing its con- 
tractors; that it was better to let the up-and-down swings in manpower 
take place in the contractor, rather than the civil service, w,xk force; and 
finally, that the practice of using support-service contractors had been 
fully disclosed to Congress and the Bureau of the Budget. VASA was 
prepared to go even further. When Cocgress and the White Hocse began 
to cut NASA's budget from 1?67 on, NASA laid off its own empl~yees at 
several centers before dismissing contract workers. Morc remarkable still. 
NAS-i's position has been sustained ir: the federal courts and would seem 
to have government-wide application. 
In the short run, NASA's use of negotiated competition for large 
R&D contracts must be judged a success. It ~nnbled NASA to assemble 
manpower-some 420,000 contract and government employees in 
1966-and disperse it gradually as the manned space program phased 
down. It tapped capabilities already available, and saved NASA from 
hdving to drveiop those sanc capabilities from scratch. Since the largest 
prime contracts- those for the Apollo spacecraft or the Saturn rocket, for 
example-required thousands of subcontractors, NASA's R&D moriics 
were spread over much of the United States, so enlarging the agency's 
clientel,-. But the system had serious weaknesses. Despite the introduction 
of incentive provisions and the negotiation of contracts for successive 
phases of the RBiD process-phased project planning--NASA was 
unable, dcspite the most strenuous efforts, to police its contractors The 
idea behind incentives was to reward the cantractor for staying w~thin cos; 
and an schedulc and to penaliz: it for falling short. But while incentives 
might reduce they could not eliminate the iecfinical uncertainties dogging 
most R&C programs. A contract designed to cover everythl,.g from the 
eariy development phases to small-quantity production was not flexible 
enough far the kind of prDgram where the end iten1 changed 7ver the life 
of the program. The contradiction between fmed targets and changing 
programs was not easy to recor~cile. Moreover, the sheer size of these pro- 
grams made it exceedingly difficiilt to find out what was going on in the 
field. NASA did not even pretend to review work belo,: the first tier of 
subcontractors. NASA's inability or unwilling~less to force its contractors 
to make major design changes led to the January 1967 fire which killed 
three prtr~nsiits and caused the Apollo program to slip IS months. 
An\ dw in NASA's procurement system was that competition 
for major contracts dwindled in the 1960s. There is r e w n  to believe that 
NASA rhox  competitively more frequently in the late 1950s and early 
1960s than it did later. It may be that by 1965 there were fewer new 
systems on which to hid. or that thc high cost of cntry locked out prospcc- 
tivc competitors. I t  was not only crtpcnsivc to get into thc space busincss 
but cvcn morc cxpensivc to stay in; t h ~ s  Grumman. NASA's numhr  two 
prime contractor during the latcr 19605, virtually withdrew from space 
systems h e r  completing its work on the lunar module and the Orbiting 
Astronomical Observatories, both of which wcrc plagucd with overruns 
and trchnical dificuftics. And as aerospace firms mcrgcd or wcrc bought 
up by compctltors. NASA found itself locked into an industry structurc 
for which it was partly rcsponsiblc. 
Finally. cvcn in thc 1960s NASA dici not havc a11 the i n - h o ~ x  skilis 
it would havc nccdcd to prov:.!c its contractors with completc tcci~nical 
dlrcction. NASA had to call in Eking to intcgratc rhc Apollo spacecraft 
with the Saturn V launch vchiclc; General Electric, to check out flight 
equipsent at Capc Canavcral; AT&T. to m up r wholly-owncd sub- 
sidiary to do systcr~s cnginccring and long-range planning for NASA. It 
must bc strcsxd that NASA+. in the Apllo program, p s ~ c d  a far 
,rcatcr dcpth of cxpcricncc and talent than thc Air Forcc's laboratoria or 
the Special Projects Oficc that devclopcd the Navy's Polaris. NASA pcr- 
sonncl determined the cond~tions undcr which contracticg would bc 
necessary. anticipated problcms before the contractor. reviewed thc con- 
tractor's work. and terminated thc contract. But thcrc wcrc areas whcre 
NF.SA cnginccrs did not havc thc same dcgrcc of compctcncc as thcu 
contractors. and where NASA had little cl~oicc but to accept the contrac- 
tor's analysis. This was thc case when NASA had morc than 35,000 
rmployccs. In thc era of the Space Shuttlc, NASA, with pcrhaps 40 pcr- 
cent fcwcr cmpioyccs, probably has less real control, less ability to change 
thc scope of work, than it had 15 ycln ago. 
Thc final arca I would likc to discuss is NAS.4.s relations with the 
Department of Ddensc. Units such as the Dcfcnsc Supply Agency. which 
administered many NASA contracts, thc Army Corps of Enginccn. which 
mulaged NASA's largcst construction projccts. and thc .4ir Forcc, which 
dctailcd officers to xrvc as program managcn and directors of ccntcr 
operating divisions-all of thcsc provided csscntial support to the agency. 
This was in addition to thc cariy. oncc-only transfers of launch vch;clcs 
likc Saturn, spacecraft likc Tiros, contractor-operated facilities likc the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, 2nd thc ttdrnical skills of Wcrnhcr von Bmun's 
t c m  of cnginccn. Simply to list cxarnples, howcvcr, gives only thc barest 
hint of thc significance, for NASA. of thc totality of such support. Thc 
csstncc of thc NASA-DoD relationship had far morc to do with mutual 
nccd than with philosophical argument: conccrning thc cxincncc or thc 
dcsirabiliry of c ~ c  spacc program or rwo. The Space Act itself could only 
outlinc thc xopc of interagency relations in :tic most g c r c d  way. Thc act 
dcclarcd that. wEilc aeronautical and spacc programs would bt managed 
by a tivtlian agcncy. "activitlcs pcculiar to or primarily wociatcd with thc 
dcvclopmcnt of weapons systcrns . . . or thc dcfcnx of thc Unitcd 
Statcs" would rcmain DoD's rcspon~ihility; and it cnioincd NASA to 
makc avai1ab:c "to agcncics directly conccrncd w~th  national 
dcfcnsc . . . discovcrics that hzvc military vduc or significancc." It is 
wcll, thcn. ta set u 'dc  prcconccptions. "Civilian" 2nd "military" wrrc 
not thc u m c  as "pcarcfu!" and "non-pccful". duplication d pro- 
grams could bc "warranted" or "unwarranted": wh~lc much of thc 
strugglc over the military uscs of spacc w s  as much btrwccn clcmcnrs 
within DoD as ktwccn DoD and NASA. 
Thc princi#s underlying thc U.S. spacc program rcsultcd less from 
anything enunciated in thc Spacc :,ct than from Prcsidmt Kcnncdy's 
dccision in May 1961 to s i g n  thc lunar-landlng program to NASA. But 
this dccision was prcccdrd by carlicr moves by NASA and DoD officials 
aid by Congrcs to prcvcnr an Air Forcc takcovcr. Thrcc of thcx mova 
wcrc paiticululy irnprtant: thc qrccmenrs ratificd by Wcbb and civilian 
Defcnsc ar?d Air Forcc officials whlch laid (he ground for funhcr cmpcra- 
tion: thc March 1961 ordcr of Sccretq of Dcfcnx Robcrt McNamara 
which, by wigning most DoD spacc programs to ihc Air Forcc. thcrcby 
gilvc rnc Sccrctary tighter control ovcr d l  military spacc operations: and 
thc p~cssurc cxcncd by the Houx Cornmittce on Scicncc and 
A3tronautirs. which authorized NASA's budgct, to givc NASA the lion's 
&arc of .aanncd spacc programs. With thc backing of thc Prcsidcnt and 
much of Congress and thc acqllicxcncc of McNmua, NASA. on thc onc 
hand, nakcc: out its position as an indcpendcnt agcncy whilc. on :he 
othcr. waging a quict behind-thc-xcna battlc wtth DoD o maintain 
that idcpendcncc. Beginning as *r: agcncy hcavily dcpcndcnt on DoD 
s u p p c ,  NASA succccdcd in frcclng itsc!f from oven DoD control by 
1963. Whcthcr ~t was thc managcmcnt of Gcnini. the mmagcmcnt of 
what bciamc the Kcnncdy Spacc Ccntcr, or thc cxstcr.cr of colocatcd 
NASA and DoD tracking stations. rhc pattern was thc samc. NASA 
would cooperate wi:h DoD. but never to thc point of giving away its 
authority 10 mcct its nccds. NASA wcrtcd is right to modify military 
launch vchirlcs to scsc  as boosters. ict contrarrs to firms alrcady hcavily 
involved in dcfcnsc work. and conduc:cd advanced studies on manncd 
spacc stations at the same time that DoD was tying to dcveko its own 
Manned Orbiting Laboratory. 
During NASA's fm three ycus, k Air Force x n t  to considcrabk 
kngths to bccomt the dominant partner in the national spacc program. 
Even some years l a te  the dircctor of NASA's OfEzc cf Dcfcnx Affiirs 
could observe that "the Air Forcc is inclined to look upon NASA as a 
competitor rather than a ovtncr LI the ficld of spacc." By 1963, however. 
the Air Force n d c d  NASA almost as much as NASA needed the Air 
Force. NASA was doing important rcsxch in the life sciences and pro- 
pulsion. and its centers had test facilities that the xrvim needed badly. 
The framework within which the two agcncla had to coexist had to li- 
commodate many arrangements: whether it was a program musgcd by 
one agcncy with thc othcr snaring in the planning of experiments; a joint 
program; a program started by one agency and tnnsfer;cd to the other; a 
joint program m t l y  funded by one agency; or programs whox succea 
dcpcndcd on the functiofiing of xpamte. coopcrating systems. The 
preconditions for coopcmclon were that DoD accept NASA's definition of 
a coordinated program as one where conrurrcncc was "not rcquircd as a 
F;-- -condition to funhcr action" and that both agencicj should ccntMLizc 
the organization of their spacc and launch vehidc prognms to make 
cooperation pcssiblc. Bctwccn 1960 and 1963, t h ~ e  conditions were met. 
The Lessons b e d  
Thc conciusion I wish to draw from thex casts is that NASA's 
rcm~kablc s;lcccss in managing R&D dcpcndcd on the ability of the 
agency's top officials to enunciate gods, :o shape the agency from within. 
to dclcgatc to thc program offica and centers the a~ithority to get the job 
done. and to kccp DOT) at mi's length. Once NASA began to l a c  the 
support of the White H o w  and Congress-rogghly from 1367-the dif- 
ficulty of running the age~cy bcrame much greater and NASA began to 
rcxmblc any othcr laigc government organization which rcdoubla its cf- 
fort as it forgets its aim. The same combination d organizatioad and 
po!itical elements which made for succers in thc first half of rhc 1360s 
could not say the reduction and cancellatiom extcndirhg from 1%: 
dmost to the present. 
Mattm 
Ir. 1961, NASA was still a laxly-structured agcncy whox field 
centers worked in relative isolation from each other and from head- 
quarters. The lunar-landing mkion demanded much greater coordina- 
tioo-and h r  the time being, grater centralization-than had betn the 
asc. One of the most important aspects of the Apollo program was the 
speed with which the crucial administrative and program decisions were 
made and the major prime c o n m  awarded. Except for the decision to 
gcz to dl-up testing (the tescing of dl the mapr Apollo components 
together), rhc principal Apollo prognm dccisiom were made between 
August 1% 1 and the end of July 1%2. Had they been stretched out over 
a 6ngcr period. it sterns unlikely that they -Id have mcivcd the sup- 
port that they did. A comparison bctwten the establishment of the Man- 
ned Spvecnft Gnter (MSC) and the Elmronics Research Center (ERC) 
LI Grrbridgc, Massachuxtts. will bring this out. NASA announced thc 
selection of Houston as the site of thc former after a brief survty. Yet the 
creation of thc ccntcr generated powerful polltical support; the site itxif 
was well I-tea in relation to Hirntsvillc and the Gpc; and the msoris 
given for establishing a new center wtre justified in relation to the p o l l o  
~nisicn. In contra,  almost r:o years elapsed bcrwccn the decision to 
es~abtish :he ERC and its f m d  cstablishmcct. There a u  no such con- 
scrms as cxLst4 in rhc c?x o; MSC; NASA could not convinic Congress 
or thc public that a capability in electronics rcscarch was as vital to the 
agency as one to develop the ApoIb spaceaaft. Thc poifit is that thc 
agency's top offiials made thc irr,ponant decisions while there was time 
IG do w. The i%1 reorganization had to bc reversed two years latcr, but it 
gave NASA managemcnr the opportunity to b r i g  thc ccntcn undcr 
tighter control than before. 
Amtbcr clement in thc success of :he NASA organizition was flex- 
ibiiity: ficxib11;r); for thc Adrninic:rator to appoint to exceprcd pi t ions ,  
to award major R&D contract. witho-~t compctitivc bidding, to reprogram 
funds withic appropriation accounts and to tiansfer bcrwccn them. to 
devise and ndniinktcr a custom-tailored entrance examination. ctc. 
Exmples sulk as thcx reprcxnt fkxibility within thc system, not a 
depmure fro= it; d e p ~ ~ u r c s  from the norm wcrc allowcd by Congress. 
thc Bureau of the Budget. and the Civil Service Commission. This flex- 
ibility allowed fol that '%fret play of thc joints" without which institu- 
tional rigor mcrtis s r s  in. Thc ~ l x  of excepted positions, for example, 
served not only to promote cm~loyecs from within, but also :o bring in 
new blood and to expose NASA .to oi~tside influences.  similar:^, withoat 
thc authority to negotiate major contracts, it  is unlikely that thc lunv 
landing would havc occurrcd on schcdulc. Indccd, this authority was 
probably morc important than thc introduction of inccntlve provisions 
from 1%i on. Incentives were difficult to adrninistcr: they required a 
grcat d d  of manpcwcr and paperwork. Ac criteria for incentive 
payments wcre hard to pul down. and there was a co~tradiction inherent 
in fuing t v g r t s  for changing prognms. NASA management might well 
have awarded devtiopmmt contmcts u;:hout a d h g  ir~ccntive pruvisions. 
But it is hard to imagine Gemini, Apllc. or tht orbiting observataries 
bccomi~g opemtlond had the agency been bound by compctirivc bid- 
ding nr other rula that would have onstmined its ability to choox its 
scwccs. The flexibility available to NASA d~~ocnded on ccnpressiond 
wilhgncrss to tolrnte practices that the Icgislaturc might have d k b w e d  
clsca~hcrc. nnd when that toleration ceased, NASA fcii victim to red t a p  
and the biucaucmtic tendency to review everything at irrvr twice. By 
1%9. for instance, it took an average of 420 days to process a conuact in- 
volving a procurement ?Ianzn. j months for headquarters to re-iicw the 
plan, urC 47 days far headquarten to approve a negotiated contrzt. 
NASA managcment saw its responsibilities in poiitical tcrrns. The 
agency's top offxi& took it upon thcmxivcs to just@ NASA where it 
ma:tcrcd most-to the Bureau of the Budget, whose fwd authorities sci 
- 
the terms of the annual budgct rcqucst, and to Congrcss, which had to 
authorize the cn:ire space program annually. What Harvcy Sapolsky has 
said abou: Paluis surely applies hcrc: "Compctitcrs had to be 
~ . -  
eliminated; reviewing agcrncies had co be outrnancuvcrcd; 
congrcssmcn. . . , r.cwspapcrmcn 2nd acadcrnicim had to be co-opted. 
Politics is 2 systcrrric rccpirrr,?ect. What distinguishes programs in 
government is not that Fame play politics and others do not, but, rather. 
that somc ar: hc:tcr P.: it th3.n oorhcrs." Thus the history of NASA from 
its enablishm~nt :o :he mid-1961% ran bc charted in terms of NASA's 
ability to design is o-n prcgrams. procure its hardware, and =upport its 
spwe:rlit withut oven Interfcrcncc from the military. The tmnsfer af the 
Jet Propu!;ion La'wratory and the von braun t a m  to NASA, the 1961 
coopcistive agrecmcnt5 on the dcvclopmcnt of launch vehicles, Prcsidcnt 
- 
iicnncdy's decision to assign thc lunar mission to a civilian agcncy, and 
the 1963 agreement by which DoD acknowledged NASA as lead agency 
in Gmini ,  111 represent stages by which NASA assexed its de:ermirlation 
to run the agcncy as its officials saw fit. Not that interagency rclaticns can 
bc easily categorized. 'VC'hiie most relations can be xcn  to fall into the 
categories of support. coordina:ion. and rivalry, there were somc that did 
.mt fit nearly into a q  category. There were others, like Gemini, that 
tcndea to bcc~rnc more like joint programs over rime; while a program 
like the Mamcd Orbiting Laboratory was, in some ways, competitive with 
ApoUo, although the former cctied heavily on NASA technology and 
p u c d  wppon. Ncvercheltss, without a strong assertion of in- 
dependence. NASA would have become what the services anticipated on 
the cvc of the Space Ac-a rexuch agcncy supporting military projtm. 
The political strategies of NASA mznagcrncnt were fc-wfold: to 
maintain NASA's independent status as :n age.~cy doing R&D; to curb 
ol~sidc  inteafcrencc by advisory and cmrdinatin~ groups; to seek the ap- 
proval of Co.!gres in actions that the agency was a b u t  to rake; and ts 
h i t  NASA's support for other agenc;cs. the kr ter  tc conccnmtc its 
rcsourca on Gcaini and Apollo. NASA's ielviorrs with L)oD arc an 
exvnple of the first type of strategy; ics ccnflicts with t t c  Space Science 
%xd of the National Academy of Scicnccs is an e m p k  cf the second; 
whik KASA's pccit~on on thc supcrsor.~ tmnsprr-to maimin an 
csscntizil~- supporting role to the Fcderal Aviation Administrq- 
tion-rb4ccied thc desire cf Webb and Deputy Administrator Hugh 
Dryden not to strain NASA resources to thc limit. Additionally, Wcbt 
disman-lcd :hc office that prepred the NASA iong-rangc pian. precisely 
to a-:aid premature commitment to something beyond Apllo. 
As mentioned before. &A?A was rcmarkab!~ dccrctrdized fur so 
!xgc An agency. Ferhaps it ~yould be more accurate to say that programs 
wch as .4p>l:o or the orbititrg obscrvatoii~s codd not have k n  managed 
without thc deicgatior. of authority to the cente~s and the Jct Propu!sion 
Laboratory-authority t~ nrgotiste contracts up to a specified amount, ro 
transfer funds txtwcsn programs, to start new research tasks without scck- 
ing specific aurhorizarion. to shift manpower f r m  one division to 
another. The strategy of scnicr management w z  to give the ccntcrs what 
the) needed to get the job done, but not 5 9  much that their work would 
its relevance to thr agentj's mission. During the 1960s. tt. 
"restarch" 2nd "dcvelopmcti:" centers trr,ded io become more like each 
other; centers reporting to o-ie program ofice Lcgar. to work f i r  others; 
while thox centers with a mixturr of projects weatherd the budgct cuts 
at the end of the decade better than thosc with one or twc large deve!op- 
ment progrrms that were phasing down. One of the most important by- 
products oi Apollo w;s the pressure it placed on tlpe c!der center? to get 
into developmen: work. It was not so much a matter of pressulc from 
headqtarters as pressure from within the centers thcmsches that bro~ght 
about this change. One wonders if the older centers had much choice; 
had they remained research centers and nothing else, they would vcry 
k l y  have dwindled into insignificaccc. The centers had. so to speak, to 
latch on to the coattails of Apollo. 
By 1969, most of the centex, particularly Marshall, were in the early 
phase of a "withdrawal process" brought on by cuts in manpower and 
funds. The preblem of new roles and miss~ons could be alleviated by thc 
centers, but only in part. NASA officials conceded in principle that a icss- 
than-best laboratory might k closcd: if it had served its initid purpose; if 
there was no IEclihood that a new role for the laboratory could be found; 
if the closing down of the laboratory would not leave a significant gap in 
the national capability to do R&D work. But most of thc centcn werc 
adaptable and nearly all had gone through at last  one reorganization in 
the late 1950s or early 1%. moving from aeronautics to launch-veh~le 
devciopment, ~r from development work on guided missilcs to lunar and 
p l m c t q  probes, as wkh the Jc: Prcpulsion Laboratory. By 1969. another 
cycle or rec,rganization was under way, as facilities that wcre no longer 
needed closed down, others werc modified to accommodate new pro- 
grams. while new fac~lities like thc Lunar Receiving Laboratory at Houston 
became acc~mplished facts. Yct the morc subtlc changes in a ccntcr's mis- 
sion could only occur very gradually. And here, it xcms, the failure of 
headquarters to drdt a coherent long-range plan left the centers at a 
serious disad~aatage. The advanced studies and task farcc r e p n s  of 
1964-1969 wcre no subct~tute far a NASA-wide p t n .  There wcre too 
many planning groups, with little cwrdinat~on between them; a lack of 
interest among the centcn: and the atificial forcing of the planniiig proc- 
ess by the creation of President Nixon's Space Task Group early in 1369. 
Still. top management m~ght have done more tc bring the process to 
some v~sible :esult inside the agency. In particular. not enough was done 
to re1a:e substantive programs to any institutional framework. 
In sum, NASA thrived during the early i960s bccausc of four 
elements within, or conferred upon, :he organization: adminatrative 
flexibi!ity; the ability of senior management to play the political game on 
the Hill, at the White House, and before the public at large; the delcga- 
tion of program manzgemcnt to the field; and the timeliness with which 
the important dccis~ofis werc made. But the sznc elements wcre not 
enough to enable N.4SA to wea:her the severest rest to which any large 
mission-oriented agency car, be put: namely, how to react to the comple- 
tion of the original rnlssion. It remains to be wen whether the Space 
Shllttle will be a truly raciica! departure for the U.S. spiice program or an 
example of an R&D program pushed throrlgh development long after 
evidence accumulated that thc mission was not a.l attractive one. 
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COMMENTARY 
I.B. Hoiley, Jr. 
As a rural Ncw Englander brought up on the prudential ethic, "eat 
it up, wcar it out, make it do, do without." I uxd  to bc shocked when I 
rcad about the profligate banking practices of thcJacksonian era. I was in- 
clined to look down my nosc at an administration that permitted the ir- 
responsible issue of ill-sccurcd bank notcs. Then some years ago 1 rcad an 
essay by Joseph A. Schumpctcr which put the problcm in a whole new 
pcrspcctivc. Inflationary emissions of papcr in that capital-starved cra 
were not simpiy a matter af policy, Schumpctcr pointed out; they wcre a 
necessity. In thc 1830s. govcrnmcnt, at all echelons, iacked the ncccssary 
tools the hurcaucra:ic apparatus, to i m p  and cnforcc regulatory con- 
trols-cvcn if it had k e n  decided, as a mattcr of policy, that such controls 
wcrc nccesary . 
As it says in the cigarette advcnixments. "Wc'vc come a long way, 
baby." For those of you in thc audience who arc under 30. it may not be 
so evident how far we'vc come in the way of perfecting governmental ap- 
paratus just sincc rhr bcginning of the spacc agc. And I date this from the 
launching of V-2 rockets by thc Nazis in World War 11. In a scnx. the 
first 20 years in space is a talc of advancing bureaucratic competence, and 
each of the p a p s  prexnted hcrr offers testimony on that thcmc. 
In my commentary on the intcrating papers wc have just heard, i 
shall takc them in rcversc ordcr, beginning with Arnold Lrvinc's. 
